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Abstract
Two studies examined the preschooler's understanding of the representational
nature of photographs. In Experiment 1, the effects of externalizing the contents of
another's mind through use of a photograph were examined. Within the context of a
"false belief' task, wherein children possess inf()rIfnItlonthatancrctor~does--not;-four
year-olds were more likely to correctly attribute a false belief to a naive actor than
were three-year-olds. No differences were found between a task in which the front of
the photograph was clearly visible and a task in which only the back of the photo was
,
visible. Four-year-olds were also more likely to report' that an actor deprived of
pertinent information would act according to his previous belief than were three-year-
olds, even when no clues were present in the scenario.
In Experiment 2, both three- and four-year-olds were able to determine that a
picture they had taken did not depict the current reality, but rather depicted the_scene
at the moment the picture was taken. Both groups were able to choose the correct
photograph whether they had taken it or had assisted the experimenter in doing so.
Thus, while three-year-olds seem to understand that a photograph shows the scene
over which the camera had acted, they do not seem to understand that a photograph
could help them to ascertain the mental state of an actor.
1
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Chapter 1 _. General Introduction
Theories of Mind
Individuals' first exposure to what has been termed "mental" is their
own conscious. awareness. One must first recognize that internal states
exist before one can intuit that someone else experiences internal states
(Perner, 1991). As children become aware that others experience inner
states, they begin to form "theories" about how the mind works. The
,
development and complexity of these "theories of mind" have become the
focus of extensive research (Astington, Harris, & Olson 1988; Bretherton,
"%.
McNew, & Beeghly-Smith, 1981; Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989; Estes,
Wellman, & Woolley, 1989; Flavell, 1988; Pemer, 1991).
Bretherton et al. (1981) stated that infants,have the ability to
recognize that others possess mental states; "they cite evidence regarding
infants' successful 'social interactions to support this claim and argue that
nine- to twelve-month-old infants have an "implicit theory of mind".
However, othet: theorists (e.g~, Perner, 1991) argue that it is not until the
second year that the child begins to understand, the inner states of others as
./".
mental. When" childrenbegiri to link the "mental" with the overt actions of
other people, they can begin to "theorize" about the mental realm (Perner,
1991). Older children's and adults' theories of mind have their foundation in
2
a belief-de'sire paradigm wherein the observer understands that an
individual acts according to what he or she believes to be true (Wellman &
Bartsch,1988). Within-this belief-desire framework, ~ndividuals not only
understand the intentional states of others; they also understand that a
person may have a belief which is not consistent with reality. In order to
have such a theory, individuals must understand that representations are
present in the mind and they must understand something about how these
representations are formed, changed or otherwise used.-
Chandler and Boyes (1982) and Wellman (1990) have proposed that
the young three-year-old's theory of mind is a theory in which the child
believes the mind to be like a container into which representations are
deposited. The young child is a "copy theorist" in that s/he believes that
thoughts are simply copies of the world, albeit in mental form, that are
impressed upon the mind when sihe perceives events. The mind is not
considered active, but a container-like thought depository.
Even though preschoolers' theories seem to fail to account for the
r mind's active processes" Wellman and Estes (1986) found that very young
children could=tCllk about differences between real objects and mental
entities. Preschoolers, even three-year-olds, seemed to understand that
real world objects can be seen and touched, and that they. have a constant
.,,~ "
existence. ,At the same time, they understood that thoughts do not have
3·
these properti~s. For example, childre'n in,Wellman and Estes' study were
able to report that a real apple could be touched, eaten and se,en by others;
whereas an apple in one's dream did not possess these qualities. However,
.. while~young_childr.en seem adept at reasoning about ,diffetences between
thoughts and physical entities, they seem less skillful at attributing beliefs to
others or even)o themselves (Wimmer & Pemer, 1983; Wimmer, Hogrefe
& Pemer, 1988). Thus, while young children appear to possess some
understanding of mental entities, it seems they have not yet come to think
abo~t the mind, representation, or the representational aspect of the mind in
the same way as do older children and adults.
Representational Aspects of Mind
In order to assess the child's understanding of the mind as
representatiomil, an examination of what constitutes a representation is
necessary. One important component that all of the representational
elemellts contain is that they are "about something else" (Perner &
Astington, 1990). What this evidences, then, is what is important about a
representation: it has a property of being about something other than itself.
This property is characteristic of both images and ideas in, the mind, as well
as physical representations like photographs and drawings (Perner, 1991).
In this context, it may be helpful to draw a distinction between
physical representations and mental representations (Perner &Astington,
4
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1990). Leslie (1987) defined a "primary" representation as one in which
the representation directly depicts the reality (e.g., a photo of a horse
represents an actual horse). According to Perner (1991), during the first
yearof-life,--the-chi-ld~-mind-operates:in-such~a7way-as-to-allow-himiheronly---
to' grasp this type of representation; the child has a "single updating" model
of the world which corresponds to the current reality. With this type of .
model the child can search for an object that s/he sees being displaced; but
s/he cannot search for invisibly displaced objects. Since s/he did not see the
displacement, effective search is only possible when the child can compare
~
a model of the present with a model of the past; that is, the child needs to
consider where the object was last seen and use this inf~rimltion to guide
his or her .search. Hence for Perner, the transition to pre-operaHonal
thought is signalled by the emergence of "multiple models".
Leslie (1987) states that secondary representations ate those
representations that do not directly correspond to the current reality.
Examples include: the representations children use during play (e.g., a
banana is a telephone); the mental replay of past ev~nts; and hypotheses
formed about future events. As mentioned above, for Perner, the child
\
begins evidencing his or her use of secondary representation at about 1 to 1
1/2 years, through the construction ofmultiple models. Multiple models' '"
replaGe the single updating model and allow childrengreater flexibility in .
5'
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their thinking. For example, children around this age are able to represent
past events, as evidenced in thelrnew ability to search for invisibly
displaced objects, and can reason about hypothetical situations as is evident
in their use of pretend play.
From these multiple models (Perner, 1991), children begin to
construct different mental models of the world. The models become more
complex with age and experi'.ence. The three-year-old begins to develop
theories about the world and is termed a "situation"theorist". The three-
year-old can use his or her models to make inferences and judgements
about correspondence. The four-year-old, however, can go a step beyond
the abilities of younger children, and uses his or her models to
"metarepresent". Metarepresentation is the ability to represent the fact
that other organisms have representational states. That is,
metarepresentation is "representa~of a representation as a
representation" (Perner, 1991, p. 35). Metarepresentational abilities allow
one to mentally represent the fact that another person possesses
representations, factual or non-factual, of the world.
Metarepresentation and False Belief
The false belief task is currently viewed as something of a
benchmark in assessing the preschooler's cognitive and metacognitive
abilities. As stated above, metarepresentation refers to the idea that a
---------------..~ ---._- 6 ---------- ~,----
......
person can represent what someone else is repres·enting. Thus, if John
- thinks that Mary thinks a chocolate bar is in the cupboard, then John can
"metarepresent", or represent Mary's representation.
While'children as young as three-years-old have proven adept at
tasks which involve predictions about actions based on desires, that is, those
tasks t~at require an understanding of the goal-directedness of individuals
whose beliefs are consistent with reality (Wellman & Bartsch, 1988), these
•
same three-year-olds consistently fail false belief tasks (Flavell, Flavell,
Green & Moses, 1990; Moses & Flavell, 1990; Wimmer & Pemer, 1983). j
In a false belief task, a child is required to infer that another person will act
according to that other person's false belief. A correct answer
demonstrates that the child knows the belief currently held by John is based
on his prior knowledge and contradicts the present reality. The "actor", in
one version of this task, entertains a belief that is false, or inconsistent with
the current reality. For instance, the child watches as John places his toy in .
the toy box. In John's absence, Mary .moves John'~ toy from the toy box to
the laundry hamper. The child has witnessed Mary's actions, yet John has
not. When John returns, the child is asked to predict where John will look
for his toy.
In another popular version of this task (Perner, Leekam & Wim.rn.:~!,
1987), the child is shown a familiar container, e.g., a Cheerios cereal box,
7
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and is asked what is inside. The child is then shown that s/he is incorrect;
the experimenter has replaced the well-known objects (Cheerios) with
r
pencils, for instance. The child is then asked what a friend who is waiting
outside will think is in the box. Again,. a~orre_ctansw_erjmplies thaUhe__child_
knows that his or her friend's answer will not be consistent with the true
state of affairs; instead, the- friend~s answer will be predicated on the
friend's prior knowledge of what that type of container usually holds.
In these versions of the false belief task, children younger than four
years of age typically give the incorrect answer. The young preschooler
will usuallYJlllswer ~he test question with the answer consistent with the
current reality. In these tasks, the child has a belief that is not held by the
other person, or has some knowledge that is not available to the other
person. Four-year-olds are thought to succeed in this task because they are
able to separate their own belief~ from those of other individuals. The four-
year-old is also beginning to understand that another person's actions will
be predicated on beliefs and desires held by that person, even though the
child himselfor herself may believe or desire something entirely different
(Wellman, 1990). In Experiment 1, the standard false belief paradigm, first
implemented by Wimmer & Perner (1983), was used in conjunction with a
photograph in an attempt to assist the child by externalizing the content of
the other person's belief. The photograph depicted the event as witnessed .
8
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by the actor. Theoretically, the photograph should help the child because the
child may be able to use the photo as an indicator of the actor's false belief.
For Perner (1991), the three-year-old is beginning to think aboqt the
.representational' relationship between beliefsand-thereal-wol'1d. -Thus, a
photo, which could potentially assist the child to map out that representing
relationship more clearly, may help to externalize the belief of the actor.
Cognitive Changes as a Function of Age?
Generally, the ability to deal effectively with mental representations
of the self and of others seems to increase as a function of age. When are
children competent enough to infer ~nother person's beliefs? Most
researchers (Flavell et al., 1990; Moses & Flavell, 1990; Perner et al., 1987;
Wimmer & Perner, 1983) find age four to be the critical age for such
abilities~(;handler et al. (1989), however, found children as young as 2.5
years of age to be able to deceive an opponent: based on this evidence,
Chandler et al. concluded that even 2.5-year-olds can instill a false belief in
another person. The children in their study left false markers, or
misleading clues, as deceptive evidence when hiding a prize from an
opponent. In their view, children as young as 2.5 or 3 years of age appear to
understand that others sometimes base their actions on representations that
do not accurately reflect the current state of theworld.
Wellman (1990) has offered an alternative explanation for Chandler
9
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et at's (1989) findings which depicts the child as using a "go away"
strategy. In Wellman's analysis, the child is a "simple desire psychologist"
in that s/he believes that people act to satisfy a desire. The child also acts to
-
~aJi~fy_his ()rh~r OWll_cl~~il~ _and 'ellgages in certainbehaviors to get the
object for himself at the competitor's expense. Without creating a false
belief, the child could just send the competitor away from the area where
the prize really is, in order to obtain it for himself (Wellman, 1990). Thus, in
an experiment like Chandler et al. 's, where the appkratus used to hide a
prize left tell-tale markers behind, the child could simply wipe away the
marker in'an effort to thwart the competitor.
.. . ..). . ... _ ... _--_ ..
,
Barrett, Plefka, Sniffen and Bassi (1991) employed hiding games
similar to those of Chandler et al. (1989) and found that 3-year-olds would
indeed use a "go away" (Wellman, 1990) strategy. The three-year-olds
were adept at destroying persisting visual evidence left by a doll which
would have led a competitor to find a prize. However, only four-year-olds
engaged in manipulating task materials (e.g., leaving false markers after
destroying true markers). This suggests that younger cliildren may not be
able to use task materials to instill a false belief in an opponent; instead, they
only remove clues that would help an opponent.
Perhaps using taskmaterials to inStill a false belief is actually a step ..
beyond awareness of a false belief. In a second experiment by Barrett et al.
-1-0
(1991), three- and four-year-olds were shown videotaped puppet shows in
. ,
which characters left beh~nd persisting visual evidence to help externalize'
the actor's prior belief. That is, puppets hid a truck whibh left "muddy" tire
tracks when it was pushed across a white board into its "garage".' In the
actor's absence, the truck was moved (without the tires touching the white
board) by another character. Children aged 3 years and 7 months and older
were able to attribute a false belief to the actor in the presence of a visual
marker. These findings suggest that the visual marker assists children in
understanding that the protagonist entertains a now erroneous belief. Thus,
children younger than four years of age seem to be able to attribute false
beliefs, even if they are unable to instill them.
.. , ~ .
Mitchell and Lacohee (1991) used a paradigm in wHich a familiar
container had unexpected contents [for the "standard" task see Perner, et
al. (1987)] and found that externalizing the child's former belief through use
of a "postcard" ena~led three-year-o!ds to correctly report their own, now:
mistaken, belief. Children were presented with a "Smarties" (candy) tube
and were ask~d what was inside. Children stated that Smarties were inside.
and were then asked to ."mail" a card that had a drawing corresponding to
their answer (pieces of Smarties candy) on it into a sealed mailbox~ Then,
subjects WeIe shown that pencils were actual.ly inside the container...
Whereas children who did not externalize their belief py selecting a picture
11
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of the hypothesized contents consistently gave the wrong answer to
questions about what they thought was originally inside t~e container,
subjects who mailed the card with the drawing of Smartiesonit usually
gave the correct answer pertaining to their previous belief. Hence, perhaps
the ability to mentally represent one's previous belief is facilitated when that
belief is externalized in the form of a picture or photograph.
Within the literature, the debate continues over the cognitive
competencies of preschoolers. It may be that three-year-olds' early
competencies with false belief and mental representation may be
demonstrated if the children are made explicitly aware of the representation
about which they are being questioned. It is important to clarify these issues
.,.
because ascertaining when children understand that other's actions are
mediated by mental representations may facilitate our descriptions and
explanations of how this understanding emerges. For examp!e, if children
possess an understanding of another person's inner thoughts only after the
age of four, there must be something different about the child's
representational abilities at age fO\lr than there was at age three. Pemer
(1991) suggests that the representational abilities become more complex as
the child perceives the world and the actions of himself or herself and otpers
.' within it. The child begins to link the observable behavior of others to the
desires and beliefs others might have, and through increased awareness of
12
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situations and goals, the child becomes able to shift his or her perspective
outward. Through specification of the developmental pattern 'of the'
seemingly qualitative shift in the child's perspective, researchers can begin
to assess how and why these changes occur.
Zaitchik (1990), Representation and "False" Photographs
Zaitchik (1990) studied children's abilities to reason about both'
mental representations (through utilization of the false belief task) and non-
mental representations in the form of photographs. According to Zaitchik,
even if young preschoolers exhibit problems with mental representations,
they should still be able to reason effectively about non-mental "
representations, such as photographs because they are less complex.
Zaitchik used a paradigm In which three-, four- arid five-year-old children
were exposed to a "classic" false beHef task (e.g., Wimmer & Pemer, 1983)
"
as well as to a "false" photograph task, wherein a photograph was taken at
"Time 1" , the scene changed at "Time 2", and the children were asked to
predict what the photograph would show. Zaitchik reasoned that the
photograph, a tangible representation, should be easier for children to
understand than should a mental, intangible representation or belief. If
children did find the photo task easier, researchers would be safe in
assuming that there is something difficult about mental representation but
, ,
not about representation per se. In Zaitchik's task, the developing process
was explicitly pointed out to the child. Then, the childwas asked, "In the
picture, where is the object?" Results showed that children under five
years of age do not perform differently than chance (chance =50%) when
. answering the test questi) Five-year-olds performed better than chance.
, Thus, Zaitchik's photograph task seemS' even more difficult than the
standard (e.g., Wimmer & Perner, 1983) false belief task. Zaitchik
confirmed this surprising outcome by having subjects participate in the false
belief task as well.
Perhaps there was some artifact of the methodology which enabled
the children to do betterin the false belief task than in the photograph task.
.----.<,
For example, the tasks may not have hap equi~alent requirements. "Probe
questions", such as, "where is (the object) now?" and "where was (the
object) when they left the-scene?" were used in the false belief version in
her preceding experiment, but not in the camera task. The lack of probes in
the camera task may have meant greater inferential demands were placed
on the children. Children's correct answers for the probe questions
(essentially all of the children remembered the sequence of events) helped
rule out the possibility that they were experiencing problems with
remembering the course of events. Zaitchik used an "equated" version of
the task, and four-year-olds still performed better. in the beliefcondition
. (mean percentage 'of trials correct .= 94%) than they did in the photograph
. ~
I,
I'·
condition (mean percentage of trials correct =72%).
Finally, Zaitchik attempted to make the action more salient in the
photograph condition by asking the child about the contents of the
photograph at the time the picture was taken, as well as asking the test
question, after the scene was changed. Since it had been suggested (Siegal,
Waters, & Dinwiddy, 1988) that asking a child the same question twice may
prompt th-e child to believe s/he was incorrect initially, Zaitchik (1990,
Experiment 5) employed a "little game" in order to ask the second question.
In the game, the child was told that another experimenter, who had not
witnessed the previous action, would like to be shown/told which puppet
was in the scene depicteq by the photograph. As before, four-year-olds'
performance was not different from chance (mean percentage of trials
correct = 55%) , and three-year-olds performed significantly worse than
chance (mean percentage of trials correct = 19%) suggesting that perhaps
three-year-olds were using some type of systematic reasoning about the
nature of the photograph, while four-year-olds maybe making the transition
from thinking about representation the, way a three-year-old does to
thinking abouf representation in the way older children do so.
Zaitchik (1990) suggested that the children think that the photograph
"updates," that it changes to represent the world as it currently' appears.
However, this could be an artifact of the procedure in which the children
15
watched the photograph develop over time. It was explicitly and repeatedly
pointed out to the children that the photograph came into being gradually
over a period of approximately 90 seconds. This might lead children to
attribute dynamic properties to the photograph.
Zaitchik (1990), however, also argued for the alternative view that
the child does understand the temporal character of photographs, (namely,
that photographs show what was in front of the camera when the button
was pressed), but that the child cannot utilize this knowledge "in the case
where the photo conflicts with the true state of affairs," (p;64 , italics
deleted). Similarly, Perner (1991) argues that the young child's problem is
,
that he or she is incapable of thinking of the photograph as a physical entity
that corresponds to a real scene while thinking of the photograph as having
an "interpretation in terms of that scene", (p. 98). That is, the child can
understand the photograph itself; but the child cannot understand that s/he
might be able to use the photograph to "stand for" the scene.
Perner (1991) tested another version of the photo task in order to
assess whether the representational nature of the photograph wasindeed
causing the preschoolers' problems or whether the general idea that one
physical entity could correspond to another physical entity was problematic
. fOf children. In one condition, a doll was placed in a yellow dress and the
.
child photographed her. The child was told that the camera would make a
1 6
picture of the doll "wearing this color" (p. 98). The doll's dress was then
changed to blue and the child was asked to predict what color the doll's
dress would be in the photograph. Children between the ages of 3.5 and 5
years of age mostly opted Jor the wrong answer (blue), said they did not
know, or simply guessed. These results are consistent with Zaitchik's
(1990) findings.
Perner (1991) also used a "control" condition called the "color
transmission task". In this task, the child was shown a yellow screen and
told that the camera (machine) would produce a piece of paper the-same
color as the screen when the button was pressed. Following this, the screen
. was changed to blue and the children were asked to predict what "color is
the paper?" The younger children in the color transmission task
significantly outscored the younger children in the photo task. Perner states~
that the non-representational nature of the paper, ("merely taking on the
same color as the screen outside", p. 99), as opposed to the representational
nature of the photo, rendered this task cognitively accessible to the three-
year-olds. Perner argued that this result shows that young three-year-oIds'
difficulty with the photograph task is that they cannot "metarepresent".
That is, they cannot represent something (the photo) as representing
something else (the doll), but they can understand that ~ machine can
produce a piece of paper the color of the screen (now removed) that it
17·
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" acted upon. Perhaps interpreting the representational aspect of the photo is
qualitatively different for the children than is the simple memory of the color
of the paper when the "machine" was pointed at it.
-Statement of Purpose
Experiment 1 will examine the question of whether externalizing a
mental representation enables the preschooler to understand another
person's mental representation within the false belief task. Experiment 2
will attempt to ascertain if three-year-olds can reason about a photograph
under certain conditions (e.g., participating in an action which is especially
,
salient and temporally organized and being able to·behaviorqlly, instead of ,
verbally, answer the test question).
Chapter 2 •. Experiment 1: Externalizing Belief
External "Tracks" and Photographs
In this experiment, the metarepresentational aspect of the false belief
task was externalized through the use of photographs. If the child can
understand a photograph in representational terms, perhaps he or she can
also understand the photograph's ability to represent the false belief of an
actor. If this is the case, the child would be exhibiting metarepresentational
skills that resea,rch on the standard false-.belief task suggested were-at most
marginal (see e.g., Perner, 1991; Wellman, 1990).
18
As discussed above, Barrett et al. (1991) found that enduring physical
traces Jeft behind as markers of an actor's belief assisted preschoolers in
correctly predicting the false belief of an actor. Barrett et al. used
particularly salient clues (tire tracks leading into the location where the
actor placed his truck). The present experiment uses this idea of an
enduring trace, but the character takes a photograph of the object. The
photographing action and the photograph itself may help improve the
.
saliency of the time when an actor formed a belief. The photograph was
placed on an easel within the scene in the center of the two hiding places.
..
In one condition the photograph faced forward, for maximum saliency; in a
second condition the photograph faced backward so its contents were not
visible, thereby reducing saliency. However, the photographing and the
actual photograph's presence could highlight the formation of a belief by" an
actor.
Whereas the tire tracks in Barrett et al. (1991) were a direct result of
the truck being pushed inside its hiding place, the photograph is a clue that is
not readily linked with, was not created by, and is not part of the object.
Sodian, Taylor, Harris & Perner (1991) found that this type of "leading" trail
may help children predict the actor's false belief. However, a photograph
does not "lead" the child to the corre~t 10c~1ion as overtly as do tire tracks,
nor does it stand out in the scene as saliently as do large, brown tracks on a
1 9
.t.
white surface.
As mentioned earlier, Mitchell and Lacohee (1991) found that three-
"
year-olds succeeded on one version of the false belief task (one pertaining
to the ch'ild's previous false belief about the contents of a container)
involving photographs. They found children could ignore current physical
evidence, provided that traces of a past event were present.
"In view of the suggestion that young children
are biased towards the physical, an obvious way
to examine whether they are capable of acknow-
ledging that.the mind is representational would
be to get them to register beliefs in an event
that leaves a physically enduring trace in the
world and then help them to make a link between
the test question about the false belief and
tpis event" (Mitchell & Lacohee, 1991, p.l11).
It is important to keep in mind that Mitchell and Lacohee used the
false beliefparadigm in which the child had a prior false belief. The method
used to create this false belief in the child is most simply called a "change of
contents" (e.g., from Smarties candy to pencils). In the present study, it
was hypothesized that children might succeed on the false belief task in
which the actor had a false belief, if physical evidence about the actor's
belief was left behiind. The actor's false belief was created through a
"change of location". Thus, although differences exist between the two
types of false belief tasks above, their correlates prompted the examination
of the idea that a photograph could serve,as evidence of the protagonist's
20·
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prior belief and could enable three-year-olds to override their preference to
report the current state of affairs. Additionally, all children in ExperItnent 1
participated in a "standard false belief' task, which provided no external
. ~
clues, so that their performance on each of these tasks CQuld be assessed.
Photographs and, Correspondence
Additional support for the photograph's potential role as facilitator in
tasks which assess preschoolers' cognitive competencies can be found in
correspondence comprehension studies. DeLoache (1989, 1991) found
preschoolers have difficulty dealing with correspondence between two real
entities, yet they can determine correspondence between a photograph and
an actual space, such as a room. DeLoache's (1991) data suggest it should
be possible to take advantage of the child's knowledge of correspondence
to test if use of a photograph, taken prior to the actor's leaving the scene and
left in the scene throughout the task, would make the actor's previous belief
more salient. If the child understands the correspondence between the
photpgraph and the actor's belief, this understanding may assist the child
and allow him or her to be successful in the false belief task.
Some Predictions
A photograph that depicts a previous state of affairs may assist young
children in understanding that an actor holds a belief that corresponds to
that previous state, even though the child himself or herself has been made
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privy to information (the current whereabouts of the object) that the actor
does not possess. If children understand the photograph as a
representational medium, then it is predicted that young three-year-olds
a
would be able to use the photograph to assist them in understanding that the
actor's belief was formed before the object was moved. The photograph
may help the child externalize the belief of the actor. When the child sees
the photograph of the object in its original location, s/he might infer that the
actor's belief corresponded to the photograph which depicted a previous
reality. When the child only sees the back of the photo, it is expected that
s/he will be somewhat more successful in reporting the actor's belief than
in the standard false belief task, because, although the photo's contents are
not visible, it may help the child to better understand that the actor took the
photograph and formed his belief while the object was in its original location.
However, children are expected to perform more poorly in this "back of the
photo" condition than in the condition where the contents of the photograph
were visible. Children younger than four years of age are expected to
perform poorly on the false belief task in which no clues were present, as
they have done in previous experiments.
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Method
Subjects
Forty children, aged 3.0 years to 5.1 years, participated in this
experiment. Children were recruiteQ from Montclair YMCA's Early
Adventures Day Camp, Montclair YMCA Child Care, and Montclair Pre-
YMCA's After School Hours program. The three-year-old group consisted
of children aged 3:0 to 3: 11 (mean age: 3:6). The four-year-old children
were aged 4:0 to 5:1 (mean age: 4:5). Groups included approximately
equal numbers of boys a~d girls.
Design
All children viewed a~"warm-up" videotape followed by one of the
two "photograph" videotapes. The design was a 2 (age) X 2 (videotaped
scenario) factorial. One age group consisted of 3-year-olds, while the other
group consisted of 4-year-olds. In one videotape the face of the photograph
was visible, while in the'other videotape only the back of the photograph
was visible. Lastly, the children viewed the "standard" false belief
videotape.
Procedure
"Warm-up" task
Children were told that they were going to view three videotaped.
puppet shows. The child was told to watch very carefully as he or she
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would be expected to answer some questions about each puppet show. All
children first viewed a "warm-up" puppet show in which Sesame Street's
Ernie gives Bert a birthday present. Prior to the presentatign of the present,
(a Winnie the Pooh doll), Bert claps enthusiastically. Bert is then given the
present, which he takes off screen "to his room". The child was then asked,
"What did Bert do before Ernie gave him the present?" The purpose of the
warm-up task was to alert children to the need to watch carefully. Most
children answered the warm-up question incorrectly; apparently, the action
(clapping) was not at all salient.
Photo Task.
Following the warm-up task, each child was randomly assigned
within age groups to one of two videotaped puppet shows. Children were
shown a videotape of an actor (Bert, a Sesame Street character) placing his
doll in a toy barn. Before exiting, the actor took a Polaroid photograph of his
doll in the barn and placed the photograph within the scene. Half of the
children viewed a puppet show in which the photograph was clearly visible
and half of the children viewed a puppet show in which only the back Of the
photograph was visible (see Appendix 1 for complete puppet show script).
In the actor's absence, an antagonist removed the doll from the barn and
placed it inside acloset. When the actor returned, the frame was paused on
the screen and the children were asked:
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Where will Bert think his Mickey Mouse is before he opens the door?
Where is his Mickey really?
Why does Bert think his Mickey is in the ? (child's answer)
Where is Beres Mickey Mouse, in the picture?
Each child's responses were recorded on audio tape and. on a data sheet.
Standard false belief task
In addition, all children viewed another videotape, analogous to the
first videotape, except that no traces or clues pertaining to the actor's prior
belief were used. At the end of this video, in which Ernie and Bert hid a
truck that wa~ relocated in their absence, the tape was paused on the
screen and the children were asked:
Where will Ernie think his truck is before he open~e door?
Where is his truck really? -
Why does Ernie think his truck is in the ? (child's answer)
Did Ernie see Oscar move his truck?
The same response and data recording format were followed. See
Appendix 2 for a complete list of questions and the order in which they were
asked for all tasks presented above.
Results and Discussion
No differences were observed between-the "visib~e" photograph
condition and 'the "not visible" pho~ograph condition and conditions were
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collapsed for subsequent analyses. Four-year-olds performed significantly
better than three-year-olds both when asked questions about the actor's 1f.
belief and about the contents of the photograph. When asked the "belief'
question Le., "Where will Bert think his Mickey Mouse is?", four-year-olds
gave the correct response significantly more often than did the three-year-
olds, X2 (1) =13.78, P < .01. A similar pattern of results was obtained for the
"picture" question i.e., " Where is Bert's Mickey Mouse, in the picture?";
four-year-olds were more likely to answer correctly than were three-year-
olds, X2 (1) =6.66, P < .05. The total number and the percentages of correct
responses are given in Table 1.
Insert Table 1 About Here
Additionally, responses on the belief question tended to correlate with
responses on the picture question, r (38) = .74,p < .05. Thus, children who
were inclined to understand that Bert would search for Mickey Mouse in
the place where he had left him, namely, in the barn, tended to report that
Mickey was in the barn in the picture as well; whereas children who said
that Bert would search for Mickey Mouse in the place where Mickey
currently resided, namely in the closet, tended to report that, in the picture,
Mickey W?S in the closet. Eleven of the twenty four-year-olds~~_r.e correct
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Table 1. Total number (of 20 per group) and the percentage
of correct responses, in parentheses, for the "belier'· question
and the "picture" question by age.
3-YEAR-OLDS
# correct
4-YEAR-OLDS
# correct
BELIEF QUESTION
1 (5%)
12(60%)
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PICTURE· QUESTION
4 (20%)
12 (60%)
across both the belief and the picture quest~ons, while only one.of the twenty
three-year-olds answered both questions correctly. Sixteen 3-year-olds
were incorrect across both questions and seven 4-year-olds answered both
questions incorrectly. This was the case even when the front of the
photograph was visible to the children: seven out of ten 3-year-olds in this
condition answered both questions incorrectly; nine 3-year-oldsv answered
the belief question incorrectly and seven 3-year-olds said that, in the photo,
Mickey was in the closet! Of the ten 4-year-olds in the photo visible
condition, only two children were incorrect on both questions, three children
were incorrect on the belief question and three children said that Mickey
was in the closet in the picture.
II}.sert Table 2 About Here
In the standard false belief task, the older group again outscored the
younger group, X2 (1) =6.66, p < .05. The total number and the percentage
---
of correct responses are given in Table 2. Thus, four-year-olds were more
likely to ~eport that Ernie would look for the truck w?ere he had left it than
were three-year-olds. Subsequent analyses, however, did not reveal any
overall relation between performance on the standard false belief task and
the photo task. As a group, childr~n who answered the belief question in
Table· 2. Total number (of 20 per group) and the percentage (in
parentheses) of correct r.esponses for the "standard false beBer'
question* and BOTH the "standard false belier' question AND the
"photo false belier' question** by age.
False Belief
3-Year-Olds:
Photo Belief Both Questions
..
# correct
4-Year-Olds:
# correct
4 (20%)
12 (60%)
1 (5%)
12 (60%)
0(0%)
10 (50%)
)'r
*Where does Ernie think his truck is? (no photograph or clues present)
**Where does Bert think his Mickey Mouse is? (photograph present; either facing
front or back)
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the photograph format correctly were no more likely than their peers to
answer the belief question correctly in the standard ve~sion of the task.
)
However, four-year-olds' responses, when assessed without consideration
to the three-year-olds' responses, were significantly corr~lated, r (18) =.58,
p < . 05. Thus, four-year-olds who answered the photo belief question
correctly, also tended to answer the standard false belief question correctly.
Thus, four-year-olds seem to have a better understanding Jor false belief
tasks in general than do three-year-olds.
Clearly, the false belief task continues to be a difficult task for
preschoolers to understand. Four-year:'olds are more adept at making
inferences regarding a character'·s false belief than are three-year-olds.
However, contrary to expectation, the externalization of the actor's belief
through use of a visible photograph did not seem to facilitate performance
for the older group. With the picture of the displaced object visible, one
might hypothesize that children would perform at ceiling on this task. Yet,
that certainly was not the case. Four-year-olds' performance, while
significantly better than three-year-olds' performance, was not near ceiling
levels. Three-year-olds gave the incorrect response the majority of the
time across conditions. This may suggest that three-year-olds are
consistently responding with the reality-based answer in spite of the
character's naivety.. Certainly, it is quite interesting that many tliree-year-
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olds reported that the photograph depicted Mickey Mouse in the closet,.
while they were looking at the photograph of Mickey in the bam. This result
could be due to the three-year-olds' tendency to respond with "reality", or
due to the wording of the question (e.g., "in the picture" translated to the
children as "in the video"), or due to the three-year-olds' understanding of
action predicated ort d~sire.
Wellman (1990) suggested that perhaps something about the young
child's knowledge about the desires of the character and his or her
knowledge of goal-seeking behavior, leads the child to predict that the actor
will act to satisfy his desire, regardless of evidence to the contrary.
Obviously, the ability to attribute a false belief to another in the presence of
current information is an advanced ability as the photograph did not seem to
facilitate perf<?rmance in three-year-olds (who performed equally poorly
across all conditions) nor did it allow four-year-olds to perform at ceiling
levels. These results raise the question of whether children understand that
the photograph represents the objed's prior location. This issue is explored
further in Experiment 2.
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Chapter 3 .. Experimen( 2
Photographs as Static Representations
In Experiment 2, the young preschooler's ability,to use photographs
as representations was assessed and preschoolers' ability to understand the
representational nature of the photographs when the task was somewhat
more accessible to them was examined. Perhaps the procedure used by
Zaitchik (1990) was responsible for the children's poor performance in her
version of the photograph task. If so, perhaps choosing which of a pair of
photographs was correct instead of verbally responding to a probe question
would be a more sensitive measure. In Experiment 2, the child was
presented with two photographs (one which depicted the current reality and
one which depicted the previous reality that was actually photographed by
the child) and asked to choose the photograph he or she had taken. It was
expected that even the youngest three-year-olds would choose the
photograRh.~theJ'-hadtakenbecaJ.ls_e_they vie~ed_the_sceneLthrough .the
viewfinder while taking the picture on their own. It was expected that three-
year-olds would choose the photograph they had helped the experimenter
take as well, although choosing correctly in this condition was expected to
be slightly more difficult t?an choosing correctly in the condition where the
children took the photograph on their own. Additionally, the developing
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Iprocess was not poirited out to the children, but was downplayed throughout
the task. This was accomplished by keeping the developing photo
intentionally out of sight. Therefore, the children should not be predisposed
to believe that the photograph is dynamic in any way.
In addition, Nelson's (1986) work on event memory suggested that
temporally organized photographed scenes, (where the scene events follow
.
logical order), would help boost performance as well because the children
J
might more easily follow the sequence of events. Photographed scenes
depicted a birthday party and a bicycle race. In the birthday party scene,
the doll initially sat at table with a birthday cake; the doll was then moved to
a scene which contained birthday presents. In the bicycle scene, the doll
initially sat at a finish line; the doll was then moved to a scene which
contained a "winner's chair". Also, it was hypothesized that if the children
actively participate in taking photographs of salient scenes, they will
succeed at this type of task as their attention may be greater when actively
participating in the event. Previous studies required the children to watch
passively as events unfolded.
Thus, while Experiment 1 seemed to show that younger children
could not understand that the photograph represented, or stood for, the
actor's belief, Experiment 2 tested whether or not~pildren could understand
more straightforward properties of a photograph. Experiment 1 required
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children to take their understanding of photographs a step beyond the
understanding required in the present experiment. That is, in the previous
experiment's belief question, the children not only had to recognize that the
-
phofograph was a static representation, they also had to understand that the
photograph of Mickey Mouse in the barn represented Bert's belief.
Zaitchik (1990) has suggested that childrel1 mistakenly attribute a
dynamic property to photographs, that is, they think that photographs
"update" to depict the present situation. If children believe this, then the
results of Experiment 1 may be less surprising. That is, since three-year-
olds often gave the incorrect response across conditions, there may be
some systematic way in which these children were interpreting the
photograph. Indeed, the "'updating" hypothesis would help explain the
results of Experiment 1's "photo not visible" condition. In the "photo visible
'-
condition", it seems that the hypothesis that young children respond with
the reality-based answer best expla~ns_ the results. In this experiment, if
children do believe in the "updating" of photographs, they will be more likely
to choose the "~istractor" photograph (of the current reality). However,
children who understand that the photograph shows what was in front of the
camera when they (or the experimenter) pressed the button will tend to
.choose the correct picture.
In contrast to Experiment 1's results, children's behaviorjn
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naturalistic settings suggests that they appreciate that photographs can
depict past events. Children are often exposed to photographs--
photographs of themselves as infants; of holidays gone by; of many types of
past events--and the children do not appear confused by them. Hence, it
seems reasonable to suggest that perhaps the procedure in Zaitchik's task,
and the complexity of the task in Experiment 1, did not allow the children to
exhibit what they know about photographs. Additionally, perhaps the
children's active participation in the task would help increase the saliency
for the children.
Method
Subjects
Children were selected from the developmental subject pool at
Lehigh University. This "pool" was created by faculty through use of birth
announcements published in local papers. Parents were contacted by
telephone and an overview of the study was outlined for them. Twenty
subjects, aged 2:10 to 4:9, participated. Children were assigned to one of
two groups depending upon their age. One group consisted of 13 three-year-
olds, (range: 2:10 to 3:10; mean age: 3:3) while the other group consisted
of 12 four-year-olds (range: 4:0 to 4:9; mean age: 4:4). Groups included
approximately equal numbers of boys and girls.
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Design
The design was a 2 X 2 factorial in which one factor was age (three-
year-olds vs. four-year-olds) and the other was the manner in which the
photo was created (child takes the photo vs. child watches experimenter
~
. take the photo). The scenes themselves (birthday, party and bicycle race)
were counterbalanced across subjects, but the area photographed (birthday
cake table and finish line) remained constant. The dependent measure
required the child to physically choose which of the two (prior scene or
present scene) photographs s/he had taken.
Procedure
During the familiarization task, each subject was shown a Polaroid
camera and was told that to use the camera, one looks through the little
window until one sees the object to be photographed. Once one sees the
, object one wishes to photograph, one can. press the button. The
experimenter explained that when the button is pushed, a light flashes and
the camera makes a noise. The photograph then emerges from the camera
but it is "wet" and must be put on a shelf to dry. The subjectwas then
instructed to take a picture of the parent who had accompanied him or her
to the lab; the photo emerged and the experimenter and the subject viewed
it when "dry". The 'child was then praised for taking such a nice picture,
told to give the photo to his or her parent, and told s/he could take the picture
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home.
Mter this familiarization task, the experimenter informed the subjeCt
that s/he could take another picture. The child then photographed either a
doll in a scene' with a birthday cake or a doll in a bicycle race scene. The
scene the child photographed- was counterbalanced across conditions. The
child always took the first picture rather than helping the experImenter do
so. This aspect was held constant so as to assess order effects, if any.
Mter the picture emerged, the child was told that the pictute was "wet"
and must be placed in a "special picture drying box" to dry. The camera
was placed near the picture box and the child assisted the experimenter in
moving the doll to another location.
-,
I
Following the birthday cake scene, the doll was moved to a scene
with birthday presents. The sequence of birthday cake-present opening
may assist the child in keeping the course of events clear as this is typically
the_ "script" at young children's birthday parties (Nelson, 1986). Following
the bicycle race' finish line scene, the doll was moved to a "winner's chair"
where the doll was presented with a trophy. Again, the idea here was that a
natural temporal sequence might assist the child to remember a scene s/he
photographed.
Mter the child took the first photograph, and the doll was moved to its
new location, the child was told that the photo was "dry". At this point, the
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experimenter drew two photogr~phs from the picture box. The
experimenter feigned surprise and stated that one of the photos must'be in
the box from another time. On~ picture depicted the scene where the doll
was first placed and the other picture depicted the scene where the doll
currently sat. The child was asked to assist the experimenter by choosing
the photo he or she had taken. The experimenter placed both photographs.
in frontof the child's parent and said, "(Child's name), can you please show
your mom the picture that you took." The child showed the picture to the
parent, both pictures were returned to the box, the doll was removed from
the scene entirely and the child was directed to the second scene to be
photographed. The subject was not given any feedback as to whether her
choice was correct or incorrect; the experimenter only said "that's a nice
picture". Parents were instructed to state the same..
Next, the child was told that this time the experimenter would look
through the "little window". The camera was pointed at the scene that the
child had not yet photographed. The experimenter told the child when she
could see th~_doll "in the window" and asked the child to assist her by
pressing the button. The same-developing and choice procedure was used
as for the first scene except the child was asked to "show your mom the
picture you helped me take." Subjects' responses were then recorded on
a data sheet.
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Results
The results were tested to determ)ne whether children's responses
differed from chance through use of a binomial tes,t. Since analyses
revealed no differences between the scenes, they were collapsed for
subsequent analyses. The data collected from the four-year-olds were
subjected to the binomial test, results revealed that they differed from
chance, p < .05, in both conditions (see Table 3). Thus, four-year-oIds were
significantly better than chance at choosing the photograph they had taken
-and at choosing the photograph they had helped take. Although the results
from the 3-year-olds failed to reach significance, as Table 3 makes clear,
chi square amilyses revealed the younger children's responses were not
significantly different from those of the 4-year-olds; thus, the age groups
were collapsed in order toana]yze the effects of photographer.
Insert Table 3 About Here
When the children took the photograph, their responses significantly
differed from chance, p < .05; when the children helped the experimenter
take the photograph, their responses significantly differed from chance, p <
.01. Therefore, the children were very good at choosing the photograph
whether they took the photograph or assisted the experimenter.
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Table 3. - Frequency of correct photograph ehoices
made across conditions for three- and four-year-olds.
PHOTOGRAPHER:
,/
Child
3-Year-Olds:
(n =·13)
# correct: 9
4-Year-Olds:
(n =12)
# correct: 10
Experimenter
10
10
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In the three-year-old group, six of the thirteen children were correct
across ,both conditions and seven children were correct on only one of the·
two tests. Incorrect responses were not more likely when the child took the
photograph than when the child helped the experimenter to do so. In the
four-year-old group, ten of the twelve children were correct across both
condjtions; of the two Eemaining children, one child was correct on only one
of two conditions and one child was not correct on either of the two
conditions.
Discussion
The children i!1 the present study were more likely to choose the
-
correct photograph than were the children in Zaitchik's (1990) study. While
three-year-olds in the present experiment did not differ from chance, they
tended to respond by choosing the correct photograph; the four-year-olds
chose the correct photograph more often than chan~e. The children in
Zaitchik's study,h~\\,e~er, were unlikely to correctly predict what a
photograph would show. Even five-year-olds in the Zaitchik experiment
were not performing at ceiling; and the three- and four-year-olds performed
much worse than did their peers in the present experiment. Several reasons
may be cited for the differences in the results.
The children in the Zaitchik (1990) study were shown the developing
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\'process of the photograph. Thus, the child might believe that the
photograph somehow "updated" over time. Perhaps watching the
,~
developing process biased the children to believe, that the photographs were
dynamic.' In the present study, the children were told that the photograph
was "wet" and would need to dry before they could look at it. Additionally,
children in the current study took the photograph or assisted the
experimenter in doing so. Instead of watching puppets act within a scene,
the children in this study actively participated in the task. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, children were not required to verbally respond to
questions about photographs; instead they chose the photo they believed
~t1).ey had taken. Even three year-olds performed rather well on this
modified version of the task. Additionally, they were no more likely to
correctly select the pho'to that they had taken than they were to correctly
select the photo they helped the experimenter take. This finding may
suggest that children do not find it any easier to reason about a situ~tion they
viewed than they find it to reason about a situation which someone else
viewed. Thus, the claim that children fail because they are "egocentric",
meaning they cannot perceive someone else's view does not seem plausible
here. Additionally, the fact that the "change of contents" false belief task
requires the child to reason about his or her own prior belief and the
"change of location" false belief task requires the child to reason about
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another's previous belief may not mean that different results should be
expected. Three-year-olds do poorly on both types of tasks while four-year-
olds perform relatively well.
Most four-year-olds were very good at choosing the correct
photograph across conditions. This ability involves more than a simple
identification of the photograph and more than remembering the photograph
because the child never saw the photo until s/he was asked to choose it.
These findings suggest that even though preschoolers are unable to solve
tasks that require understanding another person's mental representations,
they can choose the correct photograph because they recognize that the
picture corresponds to the scene that was displayed at the time the
photograph was taken.
Chapter 4 -- General Discussion
Results from Experiment 1 were consistent with previous false belief
findings (e.g., Flavell et aI., 1990; Moses & Flavell, 1990; Wimmer &Perner,
1983; Wimmer et aI., 1988), and with the hypothesis that age determines
performance. Preschool children, especially three-year-olds, found it
difficult to reason about the false belief of another. The four-year-olds
performed significantly better than the three-year-olds across conditions.
However, the hypothesis that the externalization of an actor's mental
representation (via a photograph) would facilitate performance was not
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supported. The ability to reason about the mental realm of another must be
an advanced cognitive ability, as even attempts directly aimed at facilitation
of performance did not produce the desired results. Overall, three-year-olds
performed poorly, and four-year-olds, while they outscored the younger
- ,
group, did not perform near ceiling levels even when provided with distinct
markers. In fact, four-year-olds performed no better on the photograph
false belief task than they did on the standard false belief task, in which no
clues at all are present. Also, the way the photograph was displayed
within the scene, either facing front or facing back, did not assist children's
performance on this task. Thus, the hypothesis that children in the
"photograph visible" task would be able to reason more effectively about
th~ belief of the acto~ ",/as not supported.
Perhaps children have such difficulty with false belief because they
have a tendency to report the true state of affairs or perhaps children realize
that the character is goal-directed, thus, the character will search for his
object where he is most likely to find it (W'ellman & Bartsch, 1988;
Wellman, 1990). Even the photograph in the scene may not be a salient
enough cue to assist the children in overriding their tendency to report the
true state of affairs. This finding is consistent with the false belief (Moses &
Flavell, 1990; Pemer et-aL, 1987; Wimmer & Pemer, 1983) findings which
suggest that three-year-olds seem to assume that a naive actor will search
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for his relocated object in the place where it really is, even though the actor
- • I
was not present for the relocation.
The current results are not consistent with the findings presented in
Barrett etaI., (1991). In the current study, a clear marker left by the
charaCter in the situation did not aid the children in reporting that the
character would act on the basis of that marker. Thu-s, while the "t~acks"
left by the truck in Barrett et aI. 's study seemed to increase even three-year-
aIds correct responses, the photograph in the photograph false belief task
did not seem to assist the children. Perhaps there is something more salient
about tracks or a "trail" (Sodian et aI., 1992) that leads directly to the place
where the character originally placed the object than there is ~bout a
photograph. Additionally, the tracks were created by the truck's tires,
therefore it can be argued that the tracks were more clearly a "part" of the
truck than the photograph was a "part" of the Mickey Mouse. For this
reason, in the "photo false belief' task, the photo may not.provide enough
evidence to aid young children. The photograph may be a poor type of
external marker; perhaps certain types of persisting evidence or certain
degrees of salience (e.g., tire tracks) better enables children to extrapolate
from the clue's presence to the mind of the actor. However, when the
photograph is facing front, anq the object is seen by both the 9hild and!he
actor inside its original container, it becomes more difficult to employ the
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above argument and to postulate what reasoning skills the children are
. .
using when they make the in<~orrect inference. Perhaps, the children are
answering the questions in such a way as to "ensure" the character's
retrieval of the object (Wellman ,1990). In any case, the younger group's
abundance of errors is interesting because, for the most part, these ,children
are systematically wrong; thus, it seems they are responding with reality-
based responses no matter what the task.
In addition, the present findings are inconsistent with those reported
by Mitchell and Lacohee (1991) since the photograph did not help children
to externalize the belief of the actor. In Mitchell and Lacohee's study,
children were able to successfully report that they had a false belief about
the contents of a container when they were asked to "m~il"a drawing as a
means of externalizing that previous belief. But there seems to be an
important difference between the Mitchell and Lacohee study and the
present study. In Mitchell and Lacohee's task, the children were asked to
reason about a belief that he or she once possessed; in the current task, the
children were asked to reason about a belief that a character' once
possessed. Therefore, perhaps the ability to reason about one's own false
belief is easier, or appears earlier, than the ability to reason about someone
else's false belief.·
Experiment 2 attempted to ascertain whether children have trouble
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with the type of representation depicted by a photograph (Zaitchik, 1990).
- ~
As .expected, when the task demands are· kept to a minimum, young
children Gan better understand that a ph0tograph will correspond to a
previous reality. In fact, all the children, including three-year-olds, usually
gave correct responses. They were able to choose the photo they had
taken even though one of their potential responses included as an option the
current ~tate of reality. This finding was consistentregardless of whether
the children took the photograph or whether they\O~ly assisted the
experimenter in doing so. Therefore, it seems children understand static,
physical representations, yet they possess immature theories regarding
mental representations.
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IAppendix 1: Photograph Vignette
Photograph Ta'sk' Skit*
(Bert enters the scene where a barn- and a closet are in plain sight.)
;Bert: Wow, look at this great big Mickey Mouse I won at the
fair. I wish t had someone to help me play with it. I'll go find
Cookie Monster. But, I will leave my Mickey in the barn so it
will be safe.
(Bert puts his Mickey in the barn, leaving the door open)
Bert: Hmm, look at this neat camera. This is the kind of
camera where the picture P9PS out right away. Maybe I should
take a picture of my Mickey so I will remember where it is.
(Bert takes a picture, leaves the scene momentarily with the camera
and says:)
Bert: The picture is ready.
(Bert returns with the picture and places it on an easel between the
barn and the closet. In one condition, the photo is visible to the
audience, in the other condition the photo is not visible.).
Bert: This is a nice picture. When I come back, if I look at this
,.
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. picture, it will help me to remember where my Mickey is.
(Bert exits)
(Pirate enters scene)
Pirate: Wow, look at This barn. I wonder what is inside? - Hey,
. look, Bert's new Mickey Mouse. I think I will trick Bert by
hiding his Mickey in the closet.
(Pirate takes Mickey out of barn and hides him in the closet)
Pirate: That sure is a rotten trick. Well, I am going to sneak
out of here now.
(Pirate exits)
(Bert returns with Cookie Monster)
Bert: Let's play with my new Mickey now, Cookie.
Cookie: OK.
*The false belief skit was identicql to the photograph skit, except:
no clues (i.e., the photograph) were left; the protagonists were Bert
and Ernie, the hiding places were blue and green "garages", and the
antagonist was Oscar the Grouch.
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Appendix 2: Questions Presented to Subjects
Pretest:
What did, Bert do before Ernie gave him the present?
Photo:,
Where will Bert fhink his Mickey Mouse is before he opens the door?
Where is his Mickey really?
~
Why does Bert think his Mickey is 'in the ? (child 's _§'D~We[t __
Where is Bert's Mickey Mouse, in the picture?
False belief:
Where will Ernie think his truck is before he opens the door?
Where is his truck really?
. "-
,
Why does Ernie think his truck is in the
Did Ernie see Oscar move his truck?
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___? (child's answer)
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